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Abstract 
The cost-benefit study of Nordhaus (1994) is representative for the neo-
classical approach towards global warming. Nordhaus found that no sub-
stantial emission cuts are warranted. Most of his critics have concentrated 
on the issue of discounting and demanded that a lower discount rate 
should be applied. These criticisms first miss the point and second lead to 
ethically dubious, inconsistent conclusions and inefficient policy choices. 
They miss the point because the real problem of Nordhaus’s methodology 
is his implicit underlying assumption of perfect substitutability between 
natural and other forms of capital. Given the validity of this assumption, 
lowering the rate of discount is inconsistent with current savings behav-
iour, is ethically dubious because future generations will be much richer 
than the current one anyway, and is inefficient because scarce financial 
resources are channelled into emissions abatement that exhibits rates of 
return far inferior to alternative public investments. Any call for aggres-
sive emission abatement must therefore directly attack the perfect substi-
tutability assumption of neoclassical economics and show that man-made 
capital and natural capital are complementary. The real disagreement is 
about whether consumption growth can compensate for environmental 
degradation caused by global warming. Discounting is not the issue, but 
substitutability is. Unfortunately, proponents of aggressive emission 
abatement have so far failed to provide either convincing evidence or con-
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vincing a priori reasons that man-made capital and natural capital should 
indeed be regarded as complements rather than substitutes. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
I thank James Putzel, Michael Jacobs, Christian Azar, Clive Spash and 
Lord Meghnad Desai and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
The paper has been presented at the second international conference of the 
European Society for Ecological Economics in Geneva in March 1998. Fi-
nancial assistance from the European Commission’s DG XII Marie Curie 
Research Programme (Environment and Climate) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. 
 
Short title: 
Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
4 
1. Introduction 
 
Global warming is an ideal object of study for questions of the interlinkage 
between intra- and inter-generational distribution and questions of sus-
tainability under uncertainty.1 Its essential features are that current eco-
nomic activity has large-scale long-term future consequences on both en-
vironmental amenities and the capacity to provide material well-being. 
While there is some (contested) evidence that global warming is already 
under way and water cycles as well as ecosystems react upon it (Environ-
mental Protection Agency 1997, p. 8), the bulk of impacts of global warm-
ing will clearly not be felt for another 50 years or so (Fankhauser and Tol 
1996, p. 665; Mendelsohn and Neumann 1999). That is, global warming 
will impact mainly upon future generations but mostly not the current 
one. Hence the benefits of abating greenhouse gas emissions will be en-
joyed by future generations, while the costs of abating greenhouse emis-
sions are borne by the current generation. 
But the members of future generations will rather unequally gain from 
abating greenhouse gas emissions. As a general rule, the closer a country 
to the equator the higher its damage from global warming is likely to be 
and hence its gain from emission abatement (Mendelsohn and Neumann 
1999). The specific vulnerability towards climate change depends on a 
range of factors including a country’s geophysical characteristics, but also 
its socio-institutional and infrastructural capacity. Low-level islands are 
more at risk than highlands, developed countries with their advanced ca-
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pacity to adapt and prevent are less vulnerable than developing countries. 
Interestingly, some members of future generations who happen to live in 
cold countries close to the poles, as for example Russia, might even gain 
from warming and be hurt by abating greenhouse gas emissions (Fank-
hauser and Tol 1996, p. 669). 
To make things still more complicated, the likely size of gains from 
emission abatement is a highly contested matter as well. Older estimates 
of damage due to a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere range between 1 
and 2.5% of GDP (IPCC 1996b, p. 203). More recent studies which better 
take into account sectors that might benefit from warming (such as citrus 
cropping and summer recreational activities) and the possibilities for effi-
cient adaptive behaviour to reduce potential damages come to much 
smaller estimates. Indeed, they do not exclude the possibility that modest 
global warming might be beneficial — even for those countries that earlier 
studies expected to be damaged by warming (see Mendelsohn and Neu-
mann 1999). 
In this paper I discuss the relevance of the issues of discounting and 
substitutability on addressing global warming.2 The neoclassical approach 
towards global warming has tended to recommend only minor abatement 
policies for greenhouse gases. Nordhaus (1994, p. 94), e.g., suggests an op-
timal reduction rate of greenhouse gases in 2025 of 11.1% of uncontrolled 
emissions and of 13.4% in 2075. Note that because uncontrolled emissions 
are expected to grow tremendously over time, Nordhaus’s optimal policy 
recommendation does not call for any emission cuts relative to, say, the 
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1990 level, but for further and substantial increases in greenhouse gas 
emissions over time that are only slightly lower than uncontrolled emis-
sions (see Nordhaus 1994, p. 87).3 
Environmentalists and ecologically oriented economists have criticised 
the neoclassical approach towards global warming. Mostly, they have 
concentrated on the question of discounting and demanded to apply a 
lower rate of discount for reasons of intra- as well as inter-generational 
fairness (e.g. Broome 1992, Azar and Sterner 1996). Because the distribu-
tion of the net costs of global warming is heavily skewed towards the dis-
tant future, using a lower rate of discount would warrant higher emission 
abatement (Fankhauser 1994; Chapman, Suri and Hall 1995). 
This paper argues that the demand for a lower discount rate misses the 
point and leads to inefficient policy choices. It misses the point because it 
fails to address the real issue which is the underlying assumption of per-
fect substitutability of natural through other forms of capital rather than 
the appropriate selection of a discount rate. It leads to inefficiencies be-
cause, given perfect substitutability, lowering the discount rate in general 
or for global warming in particular would channel scarce resources away 
from their most productive uses. Maybe surprisingly, the demand for a 
lower discount rate is dubious on ethical grounds as well since it calls to 
give greater weight to future generations who, given perfect substitutabil-
ity, are likely to be substantially better off than the current generation 
anyway. 
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Parts of the argument against changing the rate of discount can already 
be found in Lind (1995) and Schelling (1995). What these authors do not 
explicate, however, is that their objections are only valid if the underlying 
assumption of perfect substitutability is valid. Most authors seem to be 
unaware of the crucial importance of this assumption for policy implica-
tions on global warming. It is the aim of the paper therefore to highlight 
this importance. 
Differing assumptions about the substitutability of natural capital are 
closely linked to the quarrel between two competing paradigms of sus-
tainability: weak and strong sustainability.4 Weak sustainability is based 
on the work of Robert Solow (1974, 1993a,b) and John Hartwick (1977, 
1990) and can be called the ‘perfect substitutability paradigm’. Weak sus-
tainability requires keeping aggregate total net investment, suitably defined, 
above or equal to zero (the so-called Hartwick-rule). Loosely speaking, this 
requirement is equivalent to keeping the aggregate total value of man-made 
capital and natural capital at least constant.5 Natural capital and man-
made capital are seen as substitutes for each other both in production and 
utility functions. This means that natural capital can be safely run down as 
long as enough human-made capital is built up in exchange: it does not 
matter whether the current generation uses up non-renewable resources 
or dumps CO2 in the atmosphere as long as enough machines, roads and 
ports are built up in compensation. In the words of Solow: „Earlier genera-
tions are entitled to draw down the pool (optimally, of course!) so long as 
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they add (optimally, of course!) to the stock of reproducible capital“ (So-
low 1974, p. 41). 
Strong sustainability, instead, calls for keeping both the aggregate total 
value of man-made capital and natural capital and the total value of natural 
capital itself at least constant. This paradigm was mainly developed by 
Herman Daly and Robert Costanza (Daly 1992, 1996; Daly and Costanza 
1992). The reason for emphasising the need to keep the total value of natu-
ral capital at least constant is as follows: First, man-made capital and natu-
ral capital are thought of as being complementary and not substitutable to 
each other. Strong sustainability can therefore be labelled the ‘complemen-
tarity paradigm’. Second, due to population growth, past environmental 
degradation and resource depletion, natural capital is regarded as the lim-
iting factor. Strong sustainability also holds that rising consumption can-
not compensate future generations for environmental degradation, i.e. it 
cannot substitute for a declining stock of directly utility relevant renew-
able resources and a rising stock of pollution. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the neoclassical 
approach towards global warming for which Nordhaus’s well-known 
models are representative. Section 3 argues that the question of discount-
ing, on which most of the critics of Nordhaus have concentrated, is not the 
relevant issue. Section 4 shows that to challenge the neoclassical approach 
towards global warming, one must instead directly attack the heart of the 
assumption on which its way to discount the future rests: the assumption 
of perfect substitutability of natural capital. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The neoclassical approach towards global warming: The Nordhaus-
models 
 
Discussing global warming is no easy task: The science and economics of 
global warming is complex (see IPCC 1996a,b), there are numerous highly 
technical models for cost-benefit analysis (IPCC 1996b, pp. 374-396) and 
there is a vast and continually growing literature discussing the pros and 
cons of action. Quite clearly, I cannot and do not want to discuss all the 
details of this debate. Indeed, I will concentrate on those few aspects that 
are directly relevant to the issues of discounting and substitutability. Fur-
thermore, I will restrict my discussion to the cost-benefit analysis of the 
'DICE-model' in Nordhaus (1994), the updated and expanded version of 
Nordhaus (1991a), because this is the best known and best documented 
study and is representative in many respects of other studies using similar 
models which are reviewed in Toth (1995). The model in Nordhaus (1994) 
is itself updated in Nordhaus and Popp (1997) which is „basically a ver-
sion of the DICE model that adds another dimension, that of different un-
certain states of the world“ (p. 3). All the fundamental objections that ap-
ply to Nordhaus (1994) are valid for Nordhaus and Popp (1997) as well. 
Nordhaus’s (1994) DICE-model — the Dynamic Integrated Model of 
Climate and the Economy — is a dynamic optimisation economic growth 
model based on Ramsey (1928) in which a social planner maximises the 
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integrated sum of the utility of per capita consumption.6 Output is pro-
duced by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Output production generates greenhouse emissions which lead to global 
warming which leads, in turn, to losses in output. For a quick overview of 
the model see Nordhaus (1994, chapter 2, pp. 7-21). 
Nordhaus implicitly assumes the validity of ‘perfect substitutability’ 
which is the centre of the paradigm of weak sustainability. He does so in 
two closely related ways: First, benefits and costs are meshed together and 
computed as shares of total output — regardless of whether they are con-
nected to environmental amenities or consumption related. The only costs 
due to global warming are costs in the form of output losses. This is valid 
only if future generations do not care about whether, say, the costs of 
global warming are connected to environmental amenities that provide 
them with direct utility or restrain their capacity to consume material 
goods. Second, Nordhaus presumes perfect substitutability in the way he 
discounts the future. His formula for discounting is the well known Ram-
sey (1928) formula: 
 
  r C C
C
= + ⋅
⋅
ρ η( )  
 
The social discount rate r should be equal to the sum of the pure rate of 
time preference ρ and the product of the elasticity of the marginal utility 
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of consumption η(C) and the per capita growth rate of consumption C
C
⋅
. If 
ρ > 0, this is called (pure) utility discounting. Nordhaus (1994, p. 123) calls 
discounting because of η(C) C
C
⋅
 > 0 „growth discounting“. 
Nordhaus sets the pure rate of time preference ρ equal to 3% (Nord-
haus 1994, p. 11). He assumes a logarithmic utility function for which η(C) 
is equal to 1 (ibid., p. 11f.) and projects 
C
C
⋅
 to be about 3% in the first few 
years, declining slowly in later years (ibid., p. 125). Hence his overall dis-
count rate is approximately 6%. 
Setting the pure rate of time preference equal to 3% is controversial and 
Nordhaus’s reasons as well as the criticism thereof will be discussed later 
on. The rate of pure time preference is of no particular relevance for our 
argument that Nordhaus implicitly assumes the validity of the ‘perfect 
substitutability paradigm’, however. Setting η(C) equal to 1 is somewhat 
arbitrary, but so is more or less any assumption about the algebraic form 
of the representative consumer’s utility function from which the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption follows. Instead of simply assum-
ing a specific utility function, one can also try to infer values for η(C) from 
actual consumption decisions. Pearce and Ulph (1995, p. 17) have re-
viewed studies that have done this and provide a best estimate for η(C) of 
0.8 with a lower bound of 0.7 and an upper bound of 1.5. Nordhaus’s se-
lection of η(C) = 1 appears to be acceptable therefore. The more problem-
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atic part is 
C
C
⋅
. Nordhaus estimates output to grow at about 3% p.a. This is 
a rather high estimate and others have come up with lower figures — see 
the discussion further below. Naturally, predicting future growth rates is 
never easy and always reflects a best guess that can turn out to be wrong 
ex post. 
The specific value of 
C
C
⋅
 is not relevant for our discussion here, how-
ever. Whatever its value, the underlying assumption is invariably that en-
vironmental costs and benefits are substitutable by material benefits and 
costs. To see why, recall the ethical rationale for the inclusion of η(C) C
C
⋅
 in 
the Ramsey-formula: Given that η(C) C
C
⋅
>0, the future should count less 
because it is then presumed to be better off due to the increase in consump-
tion (weighted by the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption). 
That is, future losses arising from global warming, e.g. in the form of envi-
ronmental amenities, are implicitly assumed to be perfectly compensable 
by increased consumption! Natural and other forms of capital are perfect 
substitutes! 
One might think that if the current generation was committed to weak 
sustainability, i.e. to ensuring that the welfare of future generations is at 
least as high as the current generation's welfare, this would demand 
higher emission abatement than found by Nordhaus since he does not ex-
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plicitly take weak sustainability as a side-constraint to his cost-benefit 
analysis. This is not true, however. Solely judged from the requirements of 
non-declining welfare it is most likely that no explicit abatement policy 
whatsoever is warranted!7 The reason is that if, as all estimates seem to 
agree upon, damages from unrestricted emissions are to be less than 10% 
of GNP (IPCC 1996b, p. 218) by the middle of the next century and future 
generations are likely to be materially better off by much more than 10%, 
then there is no need to combat global warming in order to ensure non-
declining welfare into the future — given the validity of the ‘perfect sub-
stitutability paradigm’. In this sense, Nordhaus’s computations are more 
friendly to future generations than a mere commitment to keep welfare at 
least non-declining would be!8 
 
 
3. Critiques of the Nordhaus-models: why discounting is not the issue 
 
Many aspects of Nordhaus’s methodology have been attacked. To give but 
a few examples: 
 
• Ayres and Walter (1991) contend that Nordhaus’s land prices and vul-
nerability coefficients are too low. 
• Cline (1996) criticises Nordhaus’s method of computing agricultural 
costs as biased towards producing low estimates. 
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• Ekins (1996) suggests that taking into account beneficial side-effects of 
restricting CO2-emissions such as reductions in SOx- and NOx-emissions 
(so-called secondary benefits), which Nordhaus ignores, would warrant 
much higher abatement. 
• Howarth (1996) criticises Nordhaus for ignoring people’s non-use val-
ues for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems and, more gener-
ally, for largely neglecting negative impacts of global warming on eco-
systems. 
• Tol (1994) suggests that intangible goods should directly enter the util-
ity-function rather than the production function. 
• Chapman, Suri and Hall (1995) examine the consequences of a doubling 
of the CO2-concentration in the atmosphere causing higher tempera-
tures than expected by Nordhaus. 
• Price (1995) contends that Nordhaus overestimates the uptake of CO2-
emissions in the oceans. 
• Mendelsohn and Neumann (1998), on the other hand, come to the con-
clusion that Nordhaus rather overestimates damage from global warm-
ing since he underestimates the possibilities for adaptation opportuni-
ties. 
 
I cannot discuss these criticisms here for reasons of space. Rather I will 
concentrate on the question of discounting on which most critics of Nord-
haus have focused. Lowering the applied discount rate would drastically 
increase the warranted emission abatement, as confirmed by Fankhauser 
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(1994) and Chapman, Suri and Hall (1995), because the distribution func-
tion of the net costs of global warming is heavily skewed towards the dis-
tant future. 
Before examining the demand to use lower discount rates in detail, let 
us first look at why Nordhaus sets the pure rate of time preference equal 
to 3%. He does so because he believes in economic efficiency. Estimates of 
the real rate of return to investment, which is also called the opportunity 
cost of investment, vary, but they usually lie in the range of 4% to 10% p.a. 
in developed countries (Nordhaus 1991a, p. 926). Manne and Richels 
(1995, p. 5) believe that 5% represents a lower bound, Pearce (1993, p. 60) 
thinks that 7% comes close to the long-run average real rate of return, 
Cline (1992, p. 262) estimates it to be about 8%. The World Bank usually 
does not accept a project with a rate of return of less than 10% (Markandya 
and Pearce 1991, p. 140). So Nordhaus’s estimate of 6% represents a good, 
conservative guess of the real return. Now, efficiency requires that the 
government does not use a discount rate different from the opportunity 
cost. Hence with η(C) C
C
⋅
 to be estimated as 3%, it can be inferred that soci-
ety’s pure rate of time preference must be 3% because only then is the so-
cial discount rate equal to the opportunity cost of investment: 
3% + 3% = 6%.9 
The reason why the government should not use a discount rate differ-
ent from the opportunity cost of investment is that using a different, say 
lower, rate would channel scarce financial resources away from invest-
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ments that provide the future with a higher real rate of return. This ineffi-
ciency can arise within the limits of a given public budget in that resources 
are channelled away from highly productive public investments in pri-
mary education, say, towards emission abatement with a lower real rate of 
return. It can also arise with an endogenously determined public budget 
in crowding out highly productive private investments for the sake of 
low-return public investments into emission abatement. No doubt, the 
reader will realise that this argument is valid only if the ‘perfect substitut-
ability paradigm’ is valid. 
Let us now turn to the critique towards Nordhaus’s approach towards 
discounting. Many economists and philosophers have since long de-
manded to set the pure rate of time preference equal to zero for reasons of 
inter-generational fairness: being later in time should as such be no reason 
for counting less (e.g. Ramsey 1928, Pigou 1932, Rawls 1972, Broome 1992, 
Cline 1992, Azar and Sterner 1996). The main argument is that future gen-
erations are excluded from today’s market and political decisions (e.g. 
Broome 1992, p. 89f.). If future generations could reveal their preferences 
they would surely opt for higher investments for the benefit of the future, 
thus driving down the real rate of return on investment. Since we cannot 
know counter-factually what the real rate of return on investment would 
be if future generations were not excluded from today’s market and politi-
cal decisions, it can be said to be fair to set the pure rate of time preference 
equal to zero: Being later in time should be no reason for counting less. 
Hence the discount rate would be down to 3% from 6%. 
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But that is not the end of the story. Critics have also argued that Nord-
haus’s projection of 
C
C
⋅
 might be too high (Rabl 1996, p. 143). Cline (1992, 
p. 284ff.), in remembrance of the dismal per capita growth performance of 
many developing countries in the 1980s, projects worldwide 
C
C
⋅
 to be 
about 1.5% in the middle of the next century, 1% by 2100 and 0.5% by 2275 
which would bring down the rate of discount to 0.5%-1.5%. Azar and 
Sterner (1996, pp. 177ff.) have further abandoned the assumption of a 
worldwide representative consumer and have examined the consequences 
of intra-generational unequal distribution. They argue as follows: If it is 
right to apply the Ramsey-formula to future generations and ask what 
their marginal utility of rising consumption is, then it must also be right to 
ask for the marginal utility of the much poorer people in the present-day 
developing world. It was taken as a justification for discounting that fu-
ture generations are expected to be better off in Ramsey’s formula. For the 
same reason Azar and Sterner (1996, p. 178) argue „that a given (...) cost 
which affects a poor person (in a poor country) should be valued as a higher 
welfare cost than an equivalent cost affecting an average OECD citizen [italics in 
original, E.N.]“. 
Because the costs of global warming are relatively higher in developing 
countries than in developed countries because of their greater vulnerabil-
ity and their more restricted capacity for adaptation (IPCC 1996b, p. 218), 
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adjusting 
C
C
⋅
 along the lines of Azar and Sterner (1996) substantially in-
creases the level of abatement that is warranted by a cost-benefit analysis 
of global warming. The same holds true for reducing the pure rate of time 
preference (possibly to zero) or lowering estimates of 
C
C
⋅
 for the represen-
tative world consumer. 
Although I have some sympathy for these criticisms I will now argue 
that they first miss the point and second lead to ethically dubious and in-
consistent conclusions and inefficient policy choices. The two points are 
linked together, as I will also show. 
Take setting the pure rate of time preference equal to zero. The first 
thing to note is that such a proposal is inconsistent with current savings 
behaviour. Applying such a low rate of discount for policies to maximise 
social welfare would imply far more public investment and would require 
a far higher savings rate than is actually prevalent in any existing country 
(IPCC 1996b, p. 133).10 The second thing to note is that while it is true that 
future generations are not present in today’s markets, the actual rate of 
discount used by the present generation does not violate the sustainability 
constraint (at least non-declining welfare over time) if consumption is ris-
ing over time. If future generations were around and could reveal their 
preferences in today’s markets, investment into man-made capital would 
be higher, the real rate of return to investment and hence the discount rate 
would be lower and consumption would rise still faster over time. But 
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given the validity of perfect substitutability, there is no justification to 
lower the rate of discount for reasons of sustainability if non-declining 
utility is already ensured by the actual rate of discount. The third thing to 
note, related to the last point, is that the proposal to lower the rate of dis-
count is, somewhat surprisingly at first sight, contestable on ethical 
grounds as well. The reason is as follows: Even with a conservative esti-
mate for 
C
C
⋅
 of 1.5%, future generations will be almost 4.5 times better off 
100 years from now. Even if the costs of global warming by that time were, 
say, 50% of GNP, a future generation 100 years hence will still be 2.25 
times better off than the present generation. If that is the case, then setting 
the pure rate of time preference equal to zero and forcing the current gen-
eration to make more sacrifices for emission abatement than with a pure 
rate of time preference of, say, 3% is dubious for reasons of inter-
generational fairness. As Lind (1995, p. 384) has put it: 
 
Can we justify current generations sacrificing 2-3% of GWP [Gross World 
Product, E.N.] to increase the wealth of future generations who even after 
deduction for the high damage scenario are 2-15 times richer than the pre-
sent generation? The answer is clearly no on the basis of intergenerational 
equity, which must weigh in favour of the current generation. 
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Ironically, given the validity of the ‘perfect substitutability paradigm’, 
inter-generational fairness instead of calling for a zero pure rate of time 
preference would rather call for quite a high pure rate of time preference. 
What about the argument of Azar and Sterner (1996)? Here things are 
somewhat different. If we discount future values because they accrue to 
richer people in the future then it is consistent to count values that accrue 
to the future intra-generational poor differently from those that accrue to 
the rich. With global warming, there will be winners and losers and it 
could be argued that the future beneficiaries of emission abatement are 
mainly located in some of the future developing countries whereas those 
who are likely to undertake the abatement investments are mostly located 
in the present developed countries. Furthermore it could be argued that 
due to this difference in location the future beneficiaries will not be better 
off (very much) than the current people asked to undertake sacrifices: 
Even if the now poor will be, say, 4.5 times better off in 100 years they will 
not be much better off, if at all, than the currently rich. Hence it would fol-
low that, given a zero pure rate of time preference, the discount rate 
should be equal to 0% or only slightly above. It might even be negative! 
Azar and Sterner’s (1996) reasoning is consistent with the spirit of the 
Ramsey-formula. But it still leads to inconsistent conclusions and ineffi-
cient choices. Their reasoning is inconsistent with the actual provision of 
aid from the current rich to the current poor which is of a rather limited 
magnitude.11 As Schelling (1995, p. 397) has put it: 
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It would be strange to forgo a per cent or two of GNP for 50 years for the 
benefit of Indians, Chinese, Indonesians and others who will be living 50 
to 100 years from now — and probably much better off than today’s Indi-
ans, Chinese, and Indonesians — and not a tenth of that amount to in-
crease the consumption of contemporary Indians, Chinese, and Indone-
sians. 
 
But such a policy would also be hugely inefficient, even if the current 
rich were ready to make large sacrifices for the sake of people living in 
developing countries either now or in the future. Given perfect substitut-
ability, there are many much more attractive investment options from the 
viewpoint of the beneficiaries than investing in emission abatement. As 
Nordhaus (1991b, p. 57) notes, real rates of return to investment into edu-
cation are extraordinarily high in poor countries: somewhere in the region 
of 26% for primary education, 16% for secondary and 13% for higher edu-
cation. No doubt, poor people would be much better off if scarce finance 
was invested in these opportunities rather than in combating global 
warming. Given perfect substitutability, Schelling (1995, p. 401) is right in 
expecting that „if offered a choice of immediate development assistance or 
equivalent investments in carbon abatement, potential aid recipients 
would elect for the immediate“ — as would their future descendants if 
they had a voice. 
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4. The real issue: substitutability of natural capital 
 
The problem with all these propositions to lower the discount rate is that 
they do not attack the real problem with Nordhaus’s methodology, 
namely the underlying assumption of perfect substitutability. Given this 
assumption, lowering the discount rate to justify large-scale emission 
abatement is either ethically dubious because future generations are better 
off than the present generation anyway and inconsistent with the ob-
served magnitude of current savings, or it is inconsistent with the behav-
iour of the currently rich towards the currently poor and imposes upon 
the poor inefficient investments whose financial resources they would 
rather use for different purposes if given a choice. Any call for more strin-
gent emission abatement must therefore directly address the question of 
substitutability and assume, implicitly or explicitly, that man-made capital 
and natural capital are less than perfect substitutes. This is because substi-
tutability is the implicit underlying theoretical foundation for discounting. 
There have been some proposals in the literature to treat environ-
mental costs and benefits differently from other values. One is the so-
called Krutilla-Fisher-approach. Krutilla and Fisher (1975) presume that 
environmental benefits are likely to increase relative to other benefits in the 
economy — for example because future richer people will appreciate rela-
tively more environmental amenities if the income elasticity of environ-
mental appreciation is bigger than one (the environment as a superior 
good). De facto, this increase in relative value means that environmental 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
23 
benefits are discounted at less than other values or maybe even not at all. 
If the relative importance of environmental benefits grew sufficiently 
strong, they could even count more than their nominal value so that, de 
facto, they would be ‘discounted’ at a negative rate. Krutilla and Fisher 
also presume that some of the benefits from environmental destruction are 
likely to depreciate over time. The developmental benefits from dam con-
struction, e.g., are likely to depreciate over time as superior technologies 
become available. De facto, this depreciation in relative value means that 
these benefits are discounted heavier than other, especially environmental, 
values. Note the words de facto: Formally, the same uniform discount rate 
is applied to all values, it is rather the values that appreciate or depreciate, 
respectively, before they are uniformly discounted to present values. 
That the relative value of environmental goods might be rising over 
time has found the approval of the leading economist experts on global 
warming — see IPCC (1996b, p. 130). Recently, Rabl (1996) has applied the 
Krutilla-Fisher rationale to global warming under the presumption that 
the environmental benefits of combating global warming are likely to rise 
over time. Similarly, but without recourse to the Krutilla-Fisher approach, 
Tol (1994) examines the effect of letting intangible goods whose value in-
creases over time with per capita income enter the utility function. Not 
surprisingly, Rabl and Tol find that higher emission abatement is war-
ranted than Nordhaus did. 
The Krutilla-Fisher approach does not go a long way in departing from 
the ‘perfect substitutability paradigm’, however. What it says is that envi-
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ronmental and other values are still perfectly substitutable for each other, 
if only their value has been appreciated or depreciated beforehand. The 
approach does not attack the heart of the ‘substitutability paradigm’ there-
fore. 
Such an attack is undertaken by proponents of strong sustainability — 
not surprisingly so given their belief in the ‘complementarity paradigm’. 
At first glance the expected consequences of global warming seem to but-
tress their view. This is because while not every effect of global warming 
will be detrimental to natural capital and human health,12 a consensus is 
emerging (see IPCC 1995, pp. 28-36 and Environmental Protection Agency 
1997) that, for some regions at least, it will lead to or at least can lead to 
 
• a change in the species composition of forests with the possible loss 
of species and the disappearance of entire forestry types. 
• an increase in the frequency and the range of pests, pathogens and 
fires. 
• an increase in desertification and soil drying. 
• a disruption in mountain resources of food and fuel for indigenous 
people. 
• an increase in the salinity of estuaries and freshwater aquifers and 
an increase in drinking water scarcity. 
• a disruption of saltwater marshes, mangrove ecosystems, coastal 
wetlands, coral reefs, coral atolls and river deltas due to, among oth-
ers, increased coastal flooding. 
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• an increase of heat waves with damaging effects on ecosystems and 
human health. 
• an exacerbation of air pollution and an increase in airborne pollens 
and spores that lead to increased incidences of respiratory disease, 
asthma, and allergic disorders. 
• an increase in the potential transmission of infectious diseases like 
cholera, malaria, encephalities, dengue and yellow fever. 
 
In putting ecosystems under severe stress, global warming can there-
fore damage the capacity of natural capital 
 
• to provide food, fibre, medicines and energy. 
• to process and store carbon and other nutrients. 
• to assimilate waste, purify water, and regulate water runoff. 
• to control floods, soil degradation and beach erosion. 
• to provide opportunities for recreation and tourism. 
 
Since natural capital as such should be kept intact, strong sustainability 
calls for aggressive policies to combat global warming. While some warm-
ing might be unavoidable, strong sustainability would try to ensure that 
the future is harmed as little as possible, even if it is materially better off 
than the present. According to this view, global warming will degrade 
natural capital and since natural capital cannot be substituted for, global 
warming has to be prevented quite regardless of the costs of doing so.13 
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Not surprisingly the position of the proponents of strong sustainability to 
undertake drastic action against global warming is shared by environmen-
talists (see for example Leggett 1990). Their position stands in marked con-
trast to Schelling’s (1991, p. 221) belief that „any disaster to developing 
countries from climate change will be essentially a disaster to their eco-
nomic development“. 
But is it really true that damages to natural capital cannot be compen-
sated for? Proponents of aggressive emission abatement would have to 
show that first adaptive behaviour cannot avoid these damages and sec-
ond individuals exhibit utility functions in which consumption and envi-
ronmental amenities are complements (since most damages relate to envi-
ronmental amenities which enter utility functions directly). As concerns 
the first point, the already mentioned study by Mendelsohn and Neumann 
(1999) shows that adaptive behaviour can drastically reduce the expected 
damages from global warming. To be fair, however, it has to be conceded 
that neither this nor many other studies take into account health, aesthetic 
and nonmarket ecosystem impacts like species loss and loss of coastal wet-
lands. As concerns the second point, the proponents of strong sustainabil-
ity would have to show that individuals have lexicographic preferences 
with respect to environmental amenities, i.e. damage to environmental 
amenities cannot be compensated for by consumption growth, however 
big the increase. 
Unfortunately, there is hardly any reliable empirical evidence on this 
point. To my knowledge, the only available evidence comes from some 
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contingent valuation studies where minorities of interviewees have stated 
that they want environmental amenities to be preserved whatever the cost 
— 14% of the sample in Hanley and Milne (1996), 23% of the sample in 
Spash and Hanley (1995) and 24% in Stevens et al. (1991), to give some 
examples. Given that the validity of these hypothetical surveys is highly 
contested by many economists (e.g. Hausman 1993) and that, if at all, only 
minorities seem to exhibit preferences that can be interpreted as lexico-
graphic, one cannot infer that damage to environmental amenities and 
human health cannot be compensated for with consumption growth. 
Maybe because of this rather shaky evidence, some of the proponents 
of aggressive emission abatement seem to suggest therefore that the ques-
tion of substitutability can be answered a priori. Barry (1991, p. 264) argues 
that any environmental damage imposed on coming generations repre-
sents a harm that is first unjustified and second not amenable to compen-
sation: 
 
We will all agree that doing harm is in general not cancelled out by doing 
good, and conversely that doing some good does not license one to do 
harm provided it does not exceed the amount of good. For example, if you 
paid for the realignments of a dangerous highway intersection and saved 
an average of two lives a year, that would not mean that you could shoot 
one motorist per year and simply reckon on coming out ahead. 
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Sen (1982, p. 347) provides a similar line of reasoning. He regards ‘last-
ing pollution’ as a kind of oppression of future generations that cannot be 
compensated for by increased material well-being: 
 
Even if the future generation may be richer and may enjoy a higher wel-
fare level, and even if its marginal utility from the consumption gain is 
accepted to be less than the marginal welfare loss of the present genera-
tion, this may still not be accepted to be decisive for rejecting the invest-
ment when the alternative implies long-term effects of environmental pol-
lution. 
 
The problem with such wide-ranging arguments is that there is a vir-
tual infinity of actions of the present generation that affect the future and 
often the same action will have both beneficial and harmful aspects. The 
verdict that any action that inflicts some harm on coming generations is 
unjustified and cannot be compensated for calls for a virtual standstill in 
economic actions of the present generation. Radical environmentalists 
might be happy with such a scenario — but future generations will pre-
sumably be less fond of it. The point is that not imposing any harm on the 
future carries with it a tremendous opportunity cost. The world we live in 
is full of trade-offs and decisions on how to cope with these trade-offs can 
sometimes be quite awkward. Simply ignoring the existence of these 
trade-offs is not a viable position. 
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This becomes clear in examining a further argument by Barry (1991, p. 
248) who states that „while it is true that we do not know what the precise 
tastes of our remote descendants are, they are unlikely to include a desire 
for skin cancer...“. Whether this argument makes sense or not depends on 
what you mean by ‘tastes’. Surely, nobody has a desire for skin cancer as 
such, but whether future generations will accept an increase in the rate of 
skin cancer or not depends on what they get in exchange for it. Given the 
choice between no change at all and a society with hugely increased con-
sumption opportunities and increased life expectancies but a somewhat 
higher chance to develop skin cancer at some age, I would not be too sure 
that future generations would prefer the former option to the latter. 
It is therefore not so much a question of whether doing harm can in 
general be compensated by doing good, as Spash (1994) seems to suggest. 
To a certain extent this must be possible or else we are doomed for inactiv-
ity. The real question is, again, whether large-scale damage to natural 
capital caused by global warming can be compensated for by higher con-
sumption levels or not. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
It was argued in this paper that the predominant critique of Nordhaus’s 
methodology leads to nonsensical conclusions if the underlying assump-
tion of perfect substitutability is not addressed. Lind (1995, p. 384) is 
wrong in suggesting that 
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the real disagreement between the environmentalists who advocate an all 
out programme to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and economists and 
others who may be more sceptical, is a disagreement over (...) what the 
rate of per capita income growth will be and how severe the consequences 
of global warming will be. 
 
The real disagreement is about the validity of the ‘perfect substitutabil-
ity paradigm’. The proponents of strong sustainability and the environ-
mentalists regard the disturbance of the global atmospheric cycle as a 
harm to future generations that cannot be compensated for by higher con-
sumption even if future generations are as much as 20 times materially 
better off. 
If substitutability is the real issue, but discounting is not, what are the 
implications for global warming? Weak sustainability calls for laissez-
faire, strong sustainability calls for aggressive abatement policy, but which 
paradigm of sustainability is ‘correct’? Answering this question is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but Neumayer (1999, chapter 3) argues in detail 
that neither paradigm of sustainability can be falsified under scientific 
standards. As mentioned, there is hardly any reliable evidence on whether 
natural and man-made capital are substitutes or complements in utility 
functions. Whether one believes in one paradigm or the other is ultimately 
just that: a matter of belief. Hence there is no clear-cut answer on what to 
do with global warming. 
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In spite of this ambiguity, however, a good case can be made for precau-
tionary action towards global warming. The reasons are uncertainty and 
ignorance about the likely future consequences of global warming. On the 
other hand, abating greenhouse emissions is costly. Channelling scarce 
financial resources into combating global warming drags them away from 
other investment opportunities and possibly even from other environ-
mental protection measures. 
It would be optimal therefore to do two things: Firstly, a lot more re-
search should go into finding more empirical evidence on whether indi-
viduals exhibit something close to lexicographic preferences with respect 
to environmental amenities or not — difficult as that might be. One should 
beware not expecting too much from such research, however. This is be-
cause proponents of strong sustainability seem to regard the question of 
substitutability more as a normative than a positive one. In other words, 
they seem to believe that consumption growth should not be allowed to 
compensate for damage to natural capital. Hence there might not be a lot 
to be gained from more research. Secondly therefore, and given the ambi-
guity, it seems to be reasonable to realise those options first that protect 
the environment at minimal, if any, economic costs. This would imply, as 
laid down in more detail in Neumayer (1998), to establish and protect 
property rights, to abolish environmentally and economically harmful 
subsidies, to substitute market-based for command-and-control instru-
ments, to use the revenues from environmental taxation such that their 
economic costs are minimised and to help overcome obstacles for realising 
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self-paying efficiency improvements, especially in the energy sector. If 
correctly targeted, many of these measures would help to reduce emis-
sions causing global warming substantially.14 
If the current generation still thinks that additional precautionary ac-
tion is warranted, it should do so. Woodward and Bishop (1997) argue 
from an extension of the Arrow-Hurwicz (1972) framework that basing 
such a decision on the aversion against unlikely, yet catastrophic out-
comes can be a rational choice in dealing with uncertainty. Natural and 
economic science is able to guide in making this decision transparent and 
rational. It will not be able to give the answer in the society’s stead, how-
ever. This is for two reasons: First, both the natural and economic science 
of global warming is unable to provide unambiguous answers about how 
much emission abatement is warranted. Uncertainty and ignorance are too 
widespread. I cannot elaborate on this point here, but the short list of criti-
cisms against Nordhaus’s methodology I have provided above gives some 
hints. As Fankhauser (1993, p. 22), one of the leading experts on global 
warming, has put it: „Through the choice of appropriate parameter values 
almost any abatement policy can be justified“. Second, the answers are 
dependent on the underlying ethical decisions concerning how much to 
take the future welfare into account and whether one thinks that what fu-
ture generations care about is only total capital or specific sub-categories 
like natural capital. Ultimately, it is on us to decide whether we think con-
sumption growth can compensate future generations for damage to natu-
ral capital and human health or not. 
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It is a mistake to believe that there is a quasi-scientific answer on what 
to do with global warming. Proponents of weak sustainability and strong 
sustainability should argue for their case and natural and economic sci-
ence can help in making the choices transparent and rational — as far as 
that is possible. But how much abatement is warranted is ultimately de-
pendent on how risk-averse society is and which forms of capital it deems 
best for future generations, if it wants to make any discrimination at all. 
The question is rightly to be located within the political decision making 
process and should remain there. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
34 
References 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Leonid Hurwicz (1972). An Optimality Criterion 
for Decision-Making Under Ignorance. In Uncertainty and Expectations 
in Economics: Essays in Honour of G.L.S. Shackle, eds. C.F. Carter and 
J.L. Ford, pp. 1-11. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Ayres, A. and J. Walter (1991). The Greenhouse Effect: Damages, Costs 
and Abatement. Environmental and Resource Economics 1 (3) 237-270. 
Azar, Christian and Thomas Sterner (1996). Discounting and Distribu-
tional Considerations in the Context of Global Warming. Ecological 
Economics 19 (2) 169-184. 
Barry, Brian (1991). Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2. Claren-
don Press, Oxford. 
Broome, John (1992). Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
35 
Chapman, D., V. Suri and S.G. Hall (1995). Rolling DICE for the Future of 
the Planet. Contemporary Economic Policy 13 (3) 1-9. 
Cline, William R. (1992). The Economics of Global Warming. Institute for In-
ternational Economics, Washington D.C. 
Cline, William R. (1996). The Impact of Global Warming on Agriculture: 
Comment. American Economic Review 86 (5) 1309-1311. 
Daly, Herman E. (1992). Steady-state economics — Second edition with new 
essays. Earthscan, London. 
Daly, Herman E. (1996). Beyond Growth. Beacon Press, Boston. 
Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb (1989). For the Common Good. Beacon 
Press, Boston. 
Daly, Herman E. and Robert Costanza (1992). Natural Capital and Sustain-
able Development. Conservation Biology 6 (1) 37-46. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
36 
Ekins, Paul (1996). The Secondary Benefits of CO2 Abatement: How much 
Emission Reduction do They Justify?, Ecological Economics 16 (1) 13-
24. 
Environmental Protection Agency (1997). Climate Change — State of 
Knowledge. Washington D.C.: United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. 
Fankhauser, Samuel (1993). Global Warming Economics: Issues and State of 
the Art. Working Paper GEC 93-28. Centre for Social and Economic 
Research on the Global Environment, Norwich and London. 
Fankhauser, Samuel (1994). The Economic Costs of Global Warming Dam-
age: A Survey. Global Environmental Change 4 (4) 301-309. 
Fankhauser, Samuel and Richard S.J. Tol (1996). Climate Change Costs — 
Recent Advancements in the Economic Assessment. Energy Policy 24 
(7) 665-673. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
37 
Hanley, Nick and Jennifer Milne (1996). Ethical Beliefs and Behaviour in 
Contingent Valuation Surveys. Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 39 (2) 255-272. 
Hartwick, John M. (1977). Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of 
Rents from Exhaustible Resources. American Economic Review 67 (5) 
972-974. 
Hartwick, John M. (1990). Natural Resources, National Accounting and 
Economic Depreciation. Journal of Public Economics 43 (3) 291-304. 
Hausman, J. (ed.) (1993). Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Am-
sterdam: Elsevier. 
Hinrichs, Doug (1997). 2500 Economists Agree on Risks to Global Climate 
Change. Ecological Economics Bulletin 2 (2) 16-18. 
Howarth, Richard B. (1996). Climate Change and Overlapping Genera-
tions. Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (4) 100-111. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
38 
IPCC (1995). IPCC Second Assessment: Climate Change 1995 — A Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. no publishing place. 
IPCC (1996a). Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change— Contri-
bution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
IPCC (1996b). Climate Change 1995 — Economic and Social Dimensions of 
Climate Change — Contribution of Working Group III to the Second As-
sessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Krutilla, John V. and Anthony C. Fisher (1975). The Economics of Natural 
Environments. Resources for the Future, Washington D.C. 
Leggett, Jeremy (ed.) (1990). Global Warming: the Greenpeace Report. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
39 
Lind, Robert C. (1995). Intergenerational Equity, Discounting, and the Role 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Evaluating Global Climate Policy. Energy 
Policy 23 (4/5) 379-389. 
Manne, Alan and Richard Richels (1995). The Greenhouse Debate: Eco-
nomic Efficiency, Burden Sharing and Hedging Strategies. Energy 
Journal 16 (4) 1-37. 
Markandya, Anil and David W. Pearce (1991). Development, The Envi-
ronment, and the Social Rate of Discount. World Bank Research Ob-
server 6 (2) 137-152. 
Mendelsohn, Robert and James Neumann (ed.) (1999). The Impacts of Cli-
mate Change on the US Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Neumayer, Eric (1998). Preserving natural capital in a world of uncertainty 
and scarce financial resources. The International Journal of Sustainable 
Development and World Ecology 5 (1), 27-46. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
40 
Neumayer, Eric (1999). Weak versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Lim-
its of Two Opposing Paradigms. Cheltenham and Northampton: Ed-
ward Elgar Publishing. 
Nordhaus, William D. (1991a). To Slow or not to Slow: The Economics of 
the Greenhouse Effect. Economic Journal 101 (407) 920-937. 
Nordhaus, William D. (1991b). Economic Approaches to Greenhouse 
Warming. In Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses, eds. R. 
Dornbusch and J.M. Poterba, pp. 33-66. MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.). 
Nordhaus, William D. (1994). Managing the Global Commons: The Economics 
of Climate Change. MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
Nordhaus, William D. and David Popp (1997). What is the Value of Scien-
tific Knowledge? An Application to Global Warming Using the 
PRICE Model. Energy Journal 18 (1), 1-45. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
41 
Pearce, David W., Anil Markandya and Edward Barbier (1989). Blueprint 
for a Green Economy. London: Earthscan. 
Pearce, David W. (1993). Economic Values and the Natural World. Earthscan, 
London. 
Pearce, David W. and David Ulph (1995). A Social Discount Rate for the 
United Kingdom. Working Paper GEC 95-01. Centre for Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment, Norwich and Lon-
don. 
Pigou, A.C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London. 
Price, Colin (1995). Emissions, Concentrations and Disappearing CO2. Re-
source and Energy Economics 17 (1) 87-97. 
Rabl, Ari (1996). Discounting of Long-Term Costs: What would Future 
Generations Prefer us to Do? Ecological Economics 17 (3) 137-145. 
Ramsey, F.P. (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. Economic Journal 38 
(152) 543-559. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
42 
Rawls, John (1972). A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Schelling, T.C. (1991). Economic Responses to Global Warming: Prospects 
for Cooperative Approaches. In Global Warming: Economic Policy Re-
sponses, eds. R. Dornbusch and J.M. Poterba, pp. 197-221. MIT Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.). 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1995). Intergenerational Discounting. Energy Policy 
23 (4/5) 395-401. 
Sen, Amartya K. (1982). The Choice of Discount Rates for Social Benefit-
Cost Analysis. In Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, ed. 
R.C. Lind, pp. 325-352. Resources for the Future, Washington D.C. 
Solow, Robert M. (1974). Intergenerational equity and exhaustible re-
sources. Review of Economic Studies Symposium 29-46. 
Solow, Robert M. (1993a). An almost practical step toward sustainability. 
Resources Policy 19 (3) 162-172. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
43 
Solow, Robert M. (1993b). Sustainability: An Economist’s Perspective. In 
Selected Readings in Environmental Economics, eds. R. Dorfman and N. 
Dorfman, pp. 179-187. Norton, New York. 
Spash, Clive L. (1994). Double CO2 and Beyond: Benefits, Costs and Com-
pensation. Ecological Economics 10 (1) 27-36. 
Spash, Clive L. and Nick Hanley (1995). Preferences, Information and Bio-
diversity Preservation. Ecological Economics 12 (3) 191-208. 
Stevens, Thomas H., Jaime Echeverria, Ronald J. Glass, Tim Hager and 
Thomas A. More (1991). Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: 
What do CVM Estimates Really Show?. Land Economics 67 (4) 390-
400. 
Tol, Richard S.J. (1994). Communication - The Damage Costs of Climate 
Change: a Note on Tangibles and Intangibles, applied to DICE. En-
ergy Policy 22 (5) 436-438. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
44 
Toth, Ferenc L. (1995). Discounting in Integrated Assessments of Climate 
Change. Energy Policy 23 (4/5) 403-409. 
Woodward, Richard T. and Richard C. Bishop (1995). Efficiency, Sustain-
ability and Global Warming. Ecological Economics 14 (2) 101-111 
Woodward, Richard T. and Richard C. Bishop (1997). How to Decide 
When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-Based Choice-Rules in Envi-
ronmental Policy. Land Economics 73 (4) 492-507. 
Energy Policy Substitutability, not discounting, is the issue. 
45 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Sustainability is defined here as non-declining utility over time: future generations 
should be no worse off than the current generation. 
2 Most of the paper’s reasoning does not exclusively apply to global warming, however, 
but is relevant for similar global long-term environmental problems as well like ozone 
layer depletion and biodiversity loss. 
3 If uncertainty is also taken into account, then „the optimal policy (...) tends to raise con-
trol rates because of the asymmetry in the net damage function“ (Nordhaus and Popp 
1997, p. 10). 
4 The distinction between weak and strong sustainability should be credited to Pearce, 
Markanya and Barbier (1989). 
5 Capital is defined here as a stock that provides current and future (potential) flows of 
service. Natural capital is then the totality of nature, i.e. resources, plants, species and 
ecosystems, that is capable of providing human beings with material and non-material 
flows of service. 
6 On page 10 of his book Nordhaus (1994) assures the reader that „by consumption we 
mean a broad concept that includes not only traditional purchases of goods and services 
like food and shelter but also non-market items such as leisure, cultural amenities, and 
enjoyment of the environment.“ This turns out to be an empty promise, however, since 
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on the following pages consumption is used in its traditional sense of consumption of 
marketed goods and services. 
7 Note, however, that weak sustainability should be regarded as traditional neoclassical 
economics (including cost-benefit analysis) plus the additional requirement to keep wel-
fare non-declining over time. In that respect, weak sustainability would come to the 
same conclusion as Nordhaus does. 
8 Of course, the estimates about harm caused by global warming might be significantly 
wrong. Although its likelihood is very small, there is the possibility of a run-away cli-
mate catastrophe with dramatic damages if warming becomes extremely high (IPCC 
1996b, p. 207f.). Alternatively, although not likely, the future economy might grow at 
only minimally positive rates or might even contract, as Woodward and Bishop (1995, p. 
105) seem to fear. Then the requirement to keep welfare non-declining over time in itself 
would already call for some emission abatement. But currently best available guesses 
suggest that this is not the case. 
9 Note the following caveat, however: observable real rates of return to investment might 
be high because the economy is non-optimally managed. In particular, major environ-
mental externalities might not be optimally internalised. The social discount rate should 
take these externalities into account, however. Hence the social discount rate would be 
lower than the private real rate of return to investment. 
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10 My guess is that the advocates of setting the pure rate of time preference equal to zero 
if confronted with this argument would retort that policies to boost savings and public 
investment should be undertaken to maximise social welfare. 
11 Again, I would guess that Azar and Sterner (1996) would demand to raise this level of 
aid so as to maximise world social welfare, if only to remain consistent with their own 
approach. 
12 Warmer temperatures, for example, will mean reduced deaths from cold-related haz-
ards which might be bigger in size than the increased deaths from heat waves (I am 
thankful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion). More generally, individuals seem 
to prefer, ceteris paribus, warmer climates as can be seen by the fact that many retired 
people in the United States move to the country’s Southern parts. 
13 Unfortunately, the proponents of strong sustainability are not very clear on the question 
of discounting. Sometimes they seem to suggest abandoning discounting for certain so-
cial decisions (Daly and Cobb 1989, p. 155; Daly 1992, p. 142), but mostly they do not 
believe in adjusting discount rates for the benefit of the future and prefer „the more di-
rect approach of guaranteeing sustainability by means of quantitative limits and safe 
minimum standards“ (Daly and Cobb 1989, p. 152). 
14 This recommendation falls well short of the demands from the proponents of strong 
sustainability, but it is reaching further than the concensus ‘Economists’ statement on 
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climate change’ (Hinrichs 1997) that was endorsed by over 2000 economists including 
William Nordhaus, Robert Solow and five other Nobel Laureates shortly before the 
United Nations’ Environment Conference in New York in June 1997. And it is more 
radical than the community of nation-states could agree upon in the follow-up confer-
ence to Rio in Kyoto in December 1997. (The treaty is online available on the world wide 
web under the address http://www.unfcc.de). 
 
